Responsibility in an outbreak
A countermeasure is only useful if it reaches the people who need it, is made without creating a second hazard, and can be trusted when the pressure is highest. These are our commitments on access, stockpiles, safe science and reporting. Updated 31 July 2026.
Access and pricing
No outbreak should become a price barrier
Our access plans cover BX-101 Nipavir, BX-204 Marburavir, BX-308 Prionex, BX-412 Cehafex, BX-515 Lassivar, BX-620 Rabivex, BX-733 Hantrelvir, BX-806 Sudanavir, BX-1140 Poxavir, BX-1265 Arenavir, BX-1330 Riftavir and BX-1620 Meliovex. They are written before Phase 2, reviewed with public-health partners before approval, and published before launch. For countries where a disease is endemic and national income is low, the default is tiered pricing or at-cost supply — not a last-minute discount that disappears when the outbreak does.
At-cost means the documented cost of active ingredient or antibody production, fill-finish, quality release, packaging and freight, with no commercial margin or sales incentive added. We will publish the cost basis, eligibility rules and supply assumptions, and will not set a volume minimum that prevents a smaller endemic country from ordering.
- Lowest-income endemic countries receive the lowest tier or audited at-cost supply, with public purchasers able to request a written price explanation
- For the duration of a declared public health emergency, we will not enforce relevant patents against governments, public-health agencies or qualified manufacturers making an authorised countermeasure
- Post-trial access continues for participants who are benefiting, while a treating clinician and the relevant authority decide whether continued supply is appropriate
- Prices, supply allocation, donation volumes and the route for emergency requests are published before regulatory approval
Stockpiles
Doses ready before the next declaration
Outbreak response fails when a medicine exists only on paper. For each countermeasure, our launch plan includes finished-dose capacity, a shelf-life and rotation plan, and a public stockpile allocation. We will reserve at least 10% of the treatment courses manufactured in the first approved production year for donation to outbreak-response stockpiles in endemic low-income countries.
- Donations are released through a national public-health agency or a recognised multilateral mechanism such as WHO or UNICEF when an emergency is declared
- Priority is given to treatment and post-exposure protection where local procurement cannot secure an affordable supply
- Each commitment records the number of courses, formulation, expiry date, cold-chain requirement and delivery owner — not just a monetary value
- An annual inventory statement reports courses committed, released, delivered, expired and replaced, with the reason for any shortfall
Dual-use governance
Safe science is part of the science
Research on high-consequence pathogens can prevent disease and can also make harmful work easier. Our dual-use research of concern (DURC) review therefore starts before a protocol is approved, not when a manuscript is ready. The review covers the proposed agent, the experiment, the people with access, the data that will leave the facility and the foreseeable misuse of the result.
- Every live-agent proposal is screened at concept, protocol, material-transfer, result and publication stages by the biosafety and biosecurity committee
- The committee includes the institutional biosafety officer, containment operations, security, occupational health and an independent scientific member
- Higher-risk work requires a written benefit-risk assessment, named mitigations, a data-release plan and recorded approval before it starts; the committee can impose a stop-work order
- Sequence files, methods and operational details are released only after risk review, with redaction or controlled access where disclosure would increase capability for misuse
- We publish the review framework, the number of proposals screened and the status of mitigations without publishing enabling pathogen-handling instructions
Biosecurity and personnel reliability
Containment depends on people
Engineering controls are necessary but not sufficient. Before access to controlled areas, personnel complete identity and reference checks, lawful background screening, occupational-health clearance and role-specific training. Suit-laboratory staff requalify annually and after any material change in procedure; access is limited to the rooms, agents and data their role requires.
- Two-person working, individual badges and electronic entry logs apply to live high-consequence pathogen work; visitors are escorted and never receive unsupervised access
- Training covers positive-pressure suit failure, chemical-shower response, sharps injury, exposure assessment, waste and transport, with drills recorded as competency evidence
- A confidential, no-retaliation channel allows staff to report unsafe instructions, coercion, suspicious requests or a loss of material; access can be suspended pending review
- Any suspected lab-acquired infection or occupational exposure is reported immediately to the supervisor and occupational health, assessed within one hour, and notified to public-health and regulatory authorities as required
- Confirmed lab-acquired infections, exposure routes, containment actions and corrective actions are included in the next public incident summary once the facts can be verified without identifying the worker
Transparency
What we publish, and what we protect
Public trust needs evidence, not a promise that everything is simple. We publish enough for patients, regulators, outbreak planners and independent reviewers to test our claims. We do not publish operational details that would weaken containment or make harmful replication easier.
This page has been cleared for public release by the Disclosure Review Board (DRB), which meets fortnightly. The board has four members: a responsible official, the general counsel, the head of medical affairs and one external member whose identity is a standing exclusion. Material may be removed for four stated reasons: personnel safety; physical security of the containment facility; obligations under agreements we are not free to describe; and information that is accurate but that we have decided not to publish. The fourth category is the largest. Which reason applies to which entry is not itemised. The disclosure log records removals and review status. Requests concerning withheld material may be sent to disclosure@baxtra.pages.dev. This is public revision 15 of 41; material not included is not disclosed in this revision.
Clinical evidence
- SENTINEL-1, CORDON-1, VIGIL-0, BASTION-1, TRAVERSE-1, LANTERN-1, RIDGELINE-1, KEYSTONE-1, MERIDIAN-1, CROSSBAR-1, HEADWATER-1 and REDLAND-1 are registered before first enrolment
- Results are posted within 12 months of study completion or termination, including negative and inconclusive findings
- Protocol changes, recruitment status and material safety findings are updated for participants, investigators and the relevant authorities
Access evidence
- Tiered and at-cost price schedules, eligibility criteria and the audited cost components
- Patent non-enforcement terms for a declared public health emergency
- Stockpile commitments, donated courses, delivery dates, expiry and any unfilled request
Safety evidence
- DURC proposals screened, mitigations accepted and publication decisions, reported at a non-enabling level
- Training completion, requalification, near misses, exposures and confirmed lab-acquired infections
- Incident investigations and corrective actions, with personal and security-sensitive details removed
Two entries in the lab-acquired infection and near-miss register are withheld pending review. Neither involved a release. The published lab-acquired infection count of zero is accurate.
Read how our containment systems work